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Abstract
A central conclusion of the standard theory of consumption is that consumers’
preferences can be taken as theoretical primitives. Special categories of con-
sumption, such as “basic needs”, or of goods, such as “subsistence goods” are
seen as extra theoretical baggage that add few, if any, insights. This theoretical
orientation has been absorbed into the theory of aggregate demand, but the ag-
gregate theory has a serious problem that is not shared by the individual-level
theory: no matter how well-behaved the individual-level demand functions may
be, the aggregate-level function can take on almost any form. This result fol-
lows from the SMD theorem, named after Sonnenschein, Mantel, and Debreu,
who developed the theory; Kirman and Koch strengthened the results, and the
SMD-KK theorem poses a fundamental challenge to models linking micro and
macroeconomics. A standard response to the aggregation problem is to intro-
duce a representative agent, but this merely sidesteps the problem. We argue
that the aggregation problem arises, in part, because of the exclusion of needs
from the theory. Specifically, we argue that material needs—such as basic needs
for energy, water, food, and shelter—must be included as theoretical primitives
because both the needs and the satisfiers of those needs are universal. We con-
struct a microeconomic model with material needs and show that the form of the
aggregate excess demand function is not completely arbitrary, so the SMD-KK
theorem does not apply. We discuss the implications of this result.
Keywords: Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem, micro-foundations,
aggregation, needs-based consumption, hierarchical consumption, consumer
demand
1. Introduction
Near the middle of the last century the theory of individual consumer de-
mand reached a peak, as the work of Houthakker (1950) and Samuelson (1950)
closed the theoretical loop between utility-based theories and the theory of re-
vealed preference. By that time, needs, which had been an important consider-
ation in economic theory, had all but disappeared as a fit subject of research,
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because they were thought to add no additional insights to the micro-level theory
of individual or household consumption (Seeley, 1992). Since then, the standard
micro-level theory has been criticized for having unrealistic hypotheses about
human behavior (Ackerman, 1997; Kirman, 1989; Simon, 1984), and alternative
micro-level theories have been proposed that correct some of the deficiencies
(Lancaster, 1966; Stigler and Becker, 1977; Seeley, 1992). At the same time
problems with the macro-level theory of aggregate consumption appeared. The
aggregation problem1 is by now a widely understood but also widely unacknowl-
edged problem within standard economic theory (Kirman, 1989, 2006; Janssen,
1993; Chipman, 2006). The situation is serious because a major tool of economic
policy analysis—the computable general equilibrium model—is premised on the
ability to meaningfully aggregate individual-level demand to an economy-wide
demand function (Dixon et al., 1996; Ackerman, 2001; Ginsburgh and Keyzer,
2002).
The aggregation problem is captured in the so-called SMD theorem (Rizvi,
2006), named after Sonnenschein (1972), Mantel (1974), and Debreu (1974), who
built up the essential argument in a series of papers. The SMD theorem shows
that nearly any continuous function satisfying Walras’ Law can be expressed as a
sum of well-behaved individual demand functions; thus the individual theory of
consumption places almost no restrictions on aggregate excess demand. Because
the theorem is proved by construction, it could be, and was, criticized for the
specific form of the demand functions used in the construction. This critique
was strongly refuted by Kirman and Koch (1986), who showed that the theorem
holds even in the case of identical preferences and almost any initial relative
income distribution. In their own words, they showed that, “...any arbitrary
excess demand function may be generated by an exchange economy with any
fixed price independent relative income distribution and identical preferences for
all agents.” The Kirman and Koch result, which, with Chipman (2006), we call
the SMD-KK theorem, is a strong challenge to aggregation. At present there is
no known way around it aside from assuming a representative agent—that is,
assuming that the aggregate demand function looks like an individual demand
function (Kirman, 2006; Chipman, 2006). However, there is no theory that
justifies this approach (Kirman, 1992; Janssen, 1993), and the representative
agent is perhaps best viewed as a practical device to generate candidate forms
for aggregate demand functions that can then be tested empirically.
In this paper we argue that the introduction of human needs into the theory
provides a solution to the aggregation problem, although we do not think that
the solution is unique. We restate Kirman and Koch’s result in a way that is
more appropriate for our argument:
1The term “aggregation problem” is sometimes used to label a particular mathematical
problem of finding the conditions under which the structure of a micro-scale economic relation
is reproduced at the aggregate level (Janssen, 1993). In this paper we use it more generally
to mean the problem of explicitly deriving a macro-economic model from a micro-economic
model by aggregating over a population.
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Given an arbitrary excess demand function f and a relative income
distribution with a lower bound well above zero,2 it is always possible
to construct a single, well-behaved, preference function that is shared
by all consumers such that the aggregate excess demand generated
by the specified income distribution and preference function is equal
to f .
In this paper we show that when basic needs are introduced into individu-
als’ consumption decisions, one avoids the implications of Kirman and Koch’s
result, for two reasons. First, we argue that theories of human needs suggest
that, for a class of “material” needs, people within a given society have very
similar preferences and, moreover, the form of those preferences is not arbi-
trary, as the SMD-KK theorem requires (Chipman, 2006). Second, we argue on
empirical evidence provided by Jackson and Marks (1999) that, even in highly
industrialized societies, expenditure on these categories of needs is a large part
of many household budgets. By the first argument we place both a weaker and a
stronger constraint on the form of the excess demand function than assumed by
Kirman and Koch. It is weaker because individual preference functions differ for
some goods, but are identical for other goods; it is stronger because it fixes the
form of the individual preference function for goods that satisfy material needs.
From the second argument we conclude that even if material needs provide only
a portion of household expenditure, it is a large enough portion to significantly
constrain aggregate demand.
2. Human Needs and Consumption
There is a long history within economics of hierarchical, needs-based ap-
proaches to consumption (Drakopoulos and Karayiannis, 2004). Indeed, Alfred
Marshall, one of the early theorists of the current consumption model, proposed
a hierarchy of needs (Drakopoulos and Karayiannis, 2004; Haines, 1982). Out-
side of mainstream economics there has been continued interest in human needs.
Perhaps the best-known psychological theory is that of Maslow (1943), who pro-
posed a hierarchy of needs that is similar to that of Marshall. Needs lower in
Maslow’s hierarchy, such as physiological and safety needs, must be satisfied be-
fore people can pursue higher needs, such as belonging or “self-actualization”.
There have been few attempts to construct quantitative needs-based con-
sumption models, mainly because hierarchical utility functions have “kinks” in
them, which interferes with substitutability. However, limited substitutability
is a direct implication of needs-based theories of consumptions; if people do in-
deed choose partly based on hierarchical needs, then it is the task of the theorist
to accommodate this behavior within the theory. Seeley (1992) offers a notable
2The assumption of an income distribution bounded far away from zero is not emphasized
in the body of Kirman and Koch’s paper, but appears in the appendix, where they write, “We
may further assume that the endowments are large enough to make the individual demand
φi(p) 0 for every p ∈ S and every consumer i.”
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example of an explicit mathematical consumption model based on Maslow’s the-
ory. In Seeley’s model, there is a satiable basic need A1 that takes precedence
over a higher-order need A2. Satiability and precedence together suggest that
the consumer’s utility function U(A1, A2) is insensitive to changes in A2 when
A1 is below an “aspiration boundary” A¯1, and insensitive to changes in A1 when
A1 is above a “satiation boundary” A
∗
1. Between the aspiration and satiation
boundaries is a transitional region in which the consumer trades off between
A1 and A2. In keeping with recent thought about household consumption (e.g.,
Ironmonger, 1995; Stigler and Becker, 1977), Seeley assumes that people can
meet their needs either through economic or non-economic goods; we do not
explicitly include this in our model, but do accept it as a basic fact of economic
life.
Recent studies on the behavior of people in poor communities (Bebbington,
1999; Guillen-Royo, 2008), while supporting the idea that some needs are more
basic than others, have cast some doubt on strict, “lexicographic” preferences;
the hierarchy of needs is a relative rather than an absolute concept. Jackson and
Marks examine consumption data in the UK in a frame drawn from Max-Neef’s
theory of needs (Max-Neef et al., 1991), which does not impose a hierarchy,
although some of its categories (e.g., “subsistence”) are clearly more basic than
others. Max-Neef makes an important contribution to the theory of human
needs by distinguishing “needs” from “satisfiers” of those needs, a distinction
we maintain in this paper. Jackson and Marks build upon Max-Neef’s frame-
work by distinguishing “material” needs (those that cannot be met without
some material consumption) from “non-material needs” (those that can in prin-
ciple be met without any material consumption). They also distinguish needs
from structural factors, such as the amount of travel required to meet needs.
Examining aggregate UK data, they argue that, from 1954 to 1994, expenditure
for material needs barely increased, while expenditure for non-material needs
and travel increased significantly. They interpret their results to mean that over
that time people in the UK were mostly increasing their expenditure either to
maintain their levels of material needs or to meet non-material needs through
material means. Importantly, by their classification, expenditure to meet mate-
rial needs accounted for roughly one-half of total household expenditure in 1954
and nearly one-third of total expenditure in 1994; meeting material needs takes
up a great deal of household budgets, even in a highly industrialized country.
In a separate study of UK consumption data, Baxter and Moosa (1996) con-
trasted the statistical properties on expenditure to meet basic needs—food, en-
ergy products, clothing and footwear, and housing—and expenditure on other
non-durable goods. They found that both the time-series and cross-sectional
statistical properties of their basic-needs category were distinct from those of
other non-durable goods, and concluded that “basic needs” is a meaningful
economic concept with observable characteristics in aggregate economic data.
Baxter and Moosa also provided a list of criteria to identify basic needs, saying
they are: universal ; hierarchical (in that they are essential to survival); satiable;
measurable; irreducible (below a minimum level); continuing (over every con-
sumer’s lifetime); stable; additive (in that total expenditure should be roughly
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proportional to population); and absolute. We will revisit their list later in this
paper.
2.1. Quantifying basic material needs
Baxter and Moosa use only food as an example of quantifying basic needs,
while surmising that other basic needs could be similarly quantified. They are
correct, as a short survey will show. In this survey we consider basic material
needs for water, food energy, useful energy, and living space. We make no
attempt at completeness and consider only one or two sources for each of these
needs.
2.1.1. The need for water
In a well-known paper, Gleick (1996) quantified basic needs for water. He
considered drinking water, water for sanitation and bathing, and water for food
preparation. While these needs vary somewhat with the types and levels of
household activities and with climate, he proposed a uniform daily minimum
of 50 liters per person. In fact, people do get by on less than that amount, so
rather than a minimum for survival, his value is a minimum for supporting a
normal level of activity. Below this minimum people experience a higher risk of
disease and an impaired ability to carry out daily tasks.
2.1.2. Food energy intake: Metabolic needs for food
Similarly to Gleick’s minimum for water, there are minimum standards for
food energy intake to support normal activity (FAO, 2008, 2011). Also as with
water, food energy needs vary with circumstances, depending on age, gender,
and level of activity; the standards for food energy take these factors into ac-
count. “Food energy” refers to the useful (metabolizable) calories derived from
food after digestion and excretion have been accounted for. People also need
vitamins, minerals, and proteins, but the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) has identified food energy as the best single bench-
mark to measure undernutrition.
While people can and do live with food energy intake below minimal levels,
it impairs their ability to carry out normal tasks. According to the FAO’s last
estimate (FAO, 2011), about 13 per cent of the world’s population could not
meet its food energy needs.
2.1.3. The need for (useful) energy
Estimating basic needs for energy is more complex than for water or food.
Pachauri and Spreng (2004) consider three different approaches to estimating
basic needs for energy—a poverty-line measure, an engineering-based measure,
and a two-dimensional access vs. useful energy measure. They conclude that
measuring energy in terms of useful energy—that is, the energy that contributes
towards supplying an energy service—and taking access into account is the
best approach. An even more basic concept than useful energy is that of an
energy service, such as “illumination”, in contrast to the energy output of a light
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source, but it is difficult to construct comparable measures of energy services. To
calculate useful energy, the energy input (e.g., the energy supplied by complete
combustion of wood, coal, or kerosene) is multiplied by a conversion efficiency
factor.
Pachauri and Spreng’s analysis is focused on India. They find a clear hier-
archy of energy use, echoing earlier work on the “energy ladder” in developing
countries (Hosier and Cleveland, 2004), and argue that there are minimal and
quantifiable needs for energy, although they interact with level of access to dif-
ferent energy carriers. Moreover, energy needs may vary from one society to
another.
2.1.4. The need for living space
In long-term historical perspective, it is clear that people do not need much
space. Brown and Deaton (1972), updating an earlier estimate by Naroll (1962),
argued that a value of 6 square meters per capita is a reasonable worldwide pop-
ulation constant for estimating long-term historical populations from archaeo-
logical measurements of living space. In contrast, considering contemporary
Portugal, Pedro (2009) argues that below 8 square meters of habitable space
per capita living conditions are “pathological”, neutral satisfaction is achieved at
14 square meters per person, and positive satisfaction only at 20 square meters
per person. As with energy, need for living space is most likely society-specific,
but within that society it is measurable.
2.2. Prices of satisfiers of material needs
Prices for water, food, useful energy, and living space show quite distinct
patterns from one another. In this section we survey some empirical results on
prices for material needs. We are interested in countries across a wide range of
income levels, but most of the studies we refer to in this section are for India;
this is partly because of the intrinsic research interest of a populous country
undergoing rapid economic change, but also because the National Social Sur-
vey (NSS) of India provides several waves of micro-level data that can support
analysis.
A global survey found that water prices are typically regulated, but informal
and non-municipal water vendors appear where there are either no services
or inadequate services. The prices from informal sources can be much higher
than the price of municipal piped water, either because the vendors have an
effective monopoly or because of high costs for supplying water (Dagdeviren
and Robertson, 2009).
Food prices per calorie are also highly variable. Subramanian and Deaton
(1996), in a study in Maharashstra state, found a wide range of prices on a per
calorie basis, with prices for meat 26 times that for cereals. They found that, as
incomes rise, people purchase “more expensive calories”, substituting between
food groups (e.g., meat over cereals) rather than within groups.
In contrast to water and food, prices per unit of useful energy are remarkably
even. Pachauri and Spreng (2004) found, for their sample, that in 11 of their
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14 categories of consumer the average price paid for useful energy ranged from
0.28 to 0.37 Rs per kWh—a ratio of 1.3. In only three categories did they find
higher values: urban kerosene and LPG (0.43 Rs per kWh) and rural and urban
biomass (0.46 and 0.68 Rs per kWh). Urban consumers with access to electricity
faced lower prices than those without, and those relying solely on biomass were
among the poorest households. As with water, the poor in their data set paid
more than the non-poor for equivalent energy services.
Prices for living spaces vary considerably, and depend on the characteristics
of the housing. In a study of housing demand in Delhi, Ahmad et al. (2012)
found that, outside of slums, housing demand is relatively responsive to income,
and less responsive to changes in price. Within slums, the opposite is true, sug-
gesting that slum dwellers have to prioritize other consumption as their incomes
rise, consistent with a hierarchical model of consumption. What is more, slum
dwellers are responsive only to differences in the quantity of housing, and not
quality, while outside of slums households respond to differences in both the
quantity and quality of their living space.
The overall patterns of prices suggest the following observations:
1. Limited access to satisfiers of material needs leads to higher prices per unit
of service, either because of higher supply costs or an effective monopoly;
2. When access is not limited, price per unit of service is roughly equal across
different satisfiers unless they also satisfy non-material needs;
3. When satisfiers of material needs also satisfy non-material needs, they
command a premium.
We do not consider the first item, although it has important welfare implications.
We incorporate the second and third items in the model presented later in this
paper.
2.3. Satisfiability and satiability
The brief survey above confirmed that basic material needs can, to a greater
or lesser degree, be quantified, either for humanity in general (water and food),
or within the context of a particular society (energy and living space). It is
instructive at this point to reconsider Baxter and Moosa’s criteria for basic
needs (Baxter and Moosa, 1996). Most items on their list appear to hold true
of basic material needs, with some qualifications. Basic needs are universal, in
that everyone must satisfy them at some level, although that level may differ
with circumstances and from one society to another. Basic needs may be at
least partly hierarchical, although this is less clear: for example, as noted above,
people living in slums in Delhi prioritized other expenditure over living space
when their incomes increased. Basic material needs are measurable, although
the measurement can be quite involved; in the case of energy it is difficult to set
an absolute measure without taking access into account. Most basic needs are
irreducible, in that there is an absolute minimum below which people cannot
survive; for some needs there is also an identifiable and irreducible level for
7
carrying out normal activities. Finally, basic needs are continuing, stable, and
absolute.
Two of the criteria on Baxter and Moosa’s list are less clearly supported by
the examples listed above. First, it is not obvious that expenditure on basic
needs satisfiers is additive, because some material satisfiers can be consumed in
excess, prices can vary per unit of material satisfier delivered, and some people
may consume the material satisfier at rates below the minimum. Second, and
related to the first, basic material satisfiers may not be satiable. An example
of a satiable need is the need for food. Beyond a certain level of consumption,
additional calories become deadly; only waste is a survivable use of calories be-
yond what the body can accommodate. While high-income countries do waste
a great deal of food, even their calorie consumption is expected to saturate in
coming decades (FAO, 2006). This conclusion is consistent with Subramanian
and Deaton’s observation that the people in their sample appeared to buy more
expensive calories as their incomes increased; increases in their caloric intake
rose more slowly than their food expenditure. Similarly, although domestic wa-
ter use can be much higher than basic needs, this is partly because of leakage
and inefficient water use. Efficiency measures can reduce total water consump-
tion, suggesting that price is not a limiting factor, while high-income countries
can have quite modest domestic water consumption (Gleick, 2003); also, stan-
dard models of water demand assume satiation at low price levels (Arbus et al.,
2003).
In contrast to food and water, there are many uses for energy beyond basic
needs, and demand for useful energy does not saturate. There is also no natural
saturation point for living space. Pedro (2009) categorizes responses to different
amounts of living space as “pathological”, “negatively satisfied”, “neutral”, and
“positively satisfied”. His categories provide a useful frame for thinking about
these non-satiable but necessary material satisfiers, while Ahmad’s study of
housing demand (Ahmad et al., 2012) provides insights into different consumer
responses at different levels of satisfaction. It is plausible that Ahmad’s slum
residents, who were much more responsive to quantity of living space than
quality, were somewhere in the range from pathological to negative satisfaction.
In that range it is reasonable that households will, if they are not trying to
satisfy other material needs, try to improve the material satisfaction of their
need for living space at the expense of non-material needs. Above that range,
where consumers become neutral to changes in the provision of a good, they can
focus more on non-material needs; for non-satiable goods, they may meet those
needs through material means, moving into the range of positive satisfaction.
These observations suggest that some satisfiers of basic material needs are
satiable, but all are “satisfiable”. Below the level of satisfaction, consumers
seek to meet their basic material needs. Beyond that level they may increase
their consumption of material satisfiers, but may also diversify into other goods
that provide for their non-material needs. Consumption of satiable goods even-
tually saturates, perhaps increasing beyond a level of neutral satisfaction, but
saturating not far above that level.
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3. The Model
In this paper we propose a needs-based model for individual or household-
level consumption and then explore the implications at the aggregate level. In
light of the survey in the previous section the model is much simpler than
the reality, but also has some interesting behavior. We make the following
assumptions:
1. Needs are universal and partly hierarchical, in that physiological needs
must be met to some degree before they can be traded off against other
needs. While other needs can be met even when physiological needs are
not fully met, consumers will choose not to meet them at the expense of
physiological needs.
2. Everyone agrees on the satisfiers of material needs (e.g., calories of food,
liters of water, kilowatt-hours of useful energy, square meters of living
space). Also, everyone agrees on how much of a material satisfier is pro-
vided by any particular good.
3. The relationship between goods and satisfiers is strictly linear, although
the level of satisfaction is not; for example, ten chickens will provide ten
times the calories of one chicken, but—if one attempts to eat them all in
one sitting—less satisfaction.
4. Any good, including goods that provide for material needs, can also satisfy
non-material needs. But the translation of goods to non-material needs
can vary considerably from one consumer to another.
We implement these assumptions in a mathematical model through the following
definitions and assumptions:
1. We denote the set of material satisfiers by a vector y with n elements. We
use an index k = 1, . . . , n.
2. We denote the set of goods by a vector x with ` elements; each good has
a price pi. We use an index i for goods, with i = 1, . . . , `.
3. We relate goods and material satisfiers through a set of linear coefficients
bki: yk =
∑`
i=1 bkixi.
4. All consumers share a preference function ϕ(y, z), where z captures the
satisfaction of non-material needs. However, each consumer r = 1, . . . ,m
maps goods to non-material needs in a way that other consumers may not
share, denoted by a function zr(x).
5. Each consumer has a budget Ir that can, as is standard in the theory of
excess demand, be represented as the value of an endowment bundle ωr:
Ir =
∑`
i=1 piωri.
6. The preference function is insensitive to changes in z when yk ≤ βk for
any material satisfier k, where β is the level at which basic material needs
are met. While people can survive at levels below this, they focus their
expenditure on meeting basic material needs until this level.
7. The preference function is insensitive to changes in yk when yk > βk for all
material satisfiers k; while consumers may actually consume more of the
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material satisfier, above the basic-needs level that consumption is because
they are using material satisfiers to satisfy non-material needs.
8. For each material satisfier k there is a base price pik that sets a floor on
prices of goods that supply the material satisfier. Prices of goods can
therefore be written pi =
∑n
k=1 pikbki + qi, where the qi, which capture
the market value of meeting non-material needs, are positive.
To these definitions and assumptions we add the standard assumption that
individuals consume their most preferred bundle of goods consistent with their
income.3
3.1. Decision rules for poor and non-poor consumers
We first split the population of consumers into the “poor” and the “non-
poor”. Poor consumers are those who cannot afford the minimal bundle of
material satisfiers β. Below that level consumers meet only their material needs
through the market, and have identical preference rankings for bundles of ma-
terial needs satisfiers.
We denote by β(0) that bundle that will meet physiological needs at a basic
level of survival and β(1) = β as that bundle that satisfies basic material needs
at a neutral level of satisfaction. Between those two limits is a sequence of bun-
dles of basic needs satisfiers β(s), where s ∈ [0, 1] that maximize the (common)
preference function and that is ordered such that ϕ(β(s), ·) > ϕ(β(s′), ·) when-
ever s > s′. In this regime consumers’ preferences are insensitive to changes in
satisfiers of non-material needs z, so these have been replaced by a dot. Each
bundle can be met through goods that provide the material satisfier at the base
price pik, and so, to each bundle β(s), there is a corresponding income level
Ip(s) =
∑n
k=1 pikβk(s). The poor are those whose income Ir is less than the
poverty line, Ip(1). They solve the following optimization problem:
Maximize s ∈ [0, 1] such that Ir = Ip(s). (1)
In this expression maximization of the preference function has been replaced by
maximization of s because, by assumption, preference for the bundles β(s) is
strictly increasing in s.
Note that this does not uniquely specify the bundle of goods, since many
goods might supply the material satisfier at the same price per unit of service.
Individual circumstances—access, preference, skill—determine the detailed way
in which households attempt to satisfy their basic material needs. What we
3While this assumption is standard, it is questionable whether households can or do actually
do this. Cognitive limitations encourage people to use heuristics and habits when choosing
bundles of goods (Simon, 1984). Those habits and heuristics may work very well in normal
circumstances, but in times of change households may need to engage in a lengthy search for a
new set of rules (Loasby, 2001). Also, if people compare goods based on their characteristics,
as seems likely (Lancaster, 1966), and they rank characteristics ordinally, but not cardinally,
then it is easy to generate situations in which there is a cycle of preference rankings for goods
(Kapeller et al., 2012), so that consumers must invoke additional decision rules.
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claim is that if there is more than one way for the poor to meet their basic
needs, then the prices of the different options will be approximately the same
per unit of service. This redundancy does not, therefore, mean that “anything
goes”, especially in terms of prices. In reality the choice of goods to satisfy basic
needs is fairly consistent across poor consumers at the same level of consump-
tion. Pachauri and Spreng’s results for energy consumption in India (Pachauri
and Spreng, 2004), and the well-established concept of the energy ladder (Hosier
and Cleveland, 2004) both suggest that, for energy at least, poor consumers se-
lect a reasonably predictable basket of energy sources at different levels of total
energy consumption. Moreover, the decision rule for poor consumers gives us a
predictable association between income Ir and the satisfaction of material needs:
it is the vector β(s) at that level of s that satisfies the decision rule given by
Equation 1 for a given set of base prices for material needs pi. We therefore
propose that at each level of income Ir ≤ Ip(1), there is a specific bundle of ma-
terial satisfiers yp(Ir,pi) and reasonably predictable bundle of goods xp(Ir,pi).
In contrast to poor consumers, the material needs of non-poor consumers are
fully satisfied—while they may increase their material consumption beyond that
level, it is in the service of non-material needs. We define, for non-poor con-
sumers, an effective preference function
ψr(x) ≡ ϕ(β, zr(x)). (2)
Non-poor consumers seek their most preferred bundle of goods x subject to two
constraints: their budget constraint and the constraint that they meet minimal
material needs. They therefore solve the following optimization problem.
Maximize ψr(x) such that (3a)
Ir =
∑`
i=1
pixi, (3b)
∑`
i=1
bkixi ≥ βk. (3c)
Following standard practice we convert the inequality 3c into an equality by
introducing a new decision vector a with dimensionality n (that is, one value
for each material need), and write
∑`
i=1
bkixi = βk + a
2
k. (4)
We can now express the optimization problem using Lagrange multipliers λ and
µk, and maximize the objective function
S(x,a, λ,µ) = ψr(x)+λ
(
Ir −
∑`
i=1
pixi
)
+
n∑
k=1
µk
(
βk −
∑`
i=1
bkixi + a
2
k
)
. (5)
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This objective function yields the following first-order conditions.
∂ψr
∂xi
= λpi +
n∑
k=1
µkbki, (6a)
2akµk = 0, (6b)
Ir =
∑`
i=1
pixi, (6c)
∑`
i=1
bkixi = βk + a
2
k. (6d)
Combining Equations 6c and 6d, and recalling that pi =
∑n
k=1 pikbki + qi, we
can rewrite Equation 6c in a way that will be useful later,
Ir =
n∑
k=1
pik
(
βk + a
2
k
)
+
∑`
i=1
qixi. (7)
Equation 6b is typical of an inequality constraint. It says that either ak =
0 or µk = 0 for each material need k. If ak = 0 then, from Equation 6d,
the material need is exactly satisfied, so Equation 6b separates satiable basic
material needs from non-satiable needs.
3.2. Satiable and non-satiable material needs
We consider two subsets of material satisfiers: the set of satiable material
satisfiers, for which ak = 0 and µk 6= 0, and the set of non-satiable material
satisfiers, for which ak 6= 0 and µk = 0. Suppose first that a good xi does
not provide any satiable material satisfiers, so that bki is zero for any k that
represents a satiable satisfier. In that case, from Equation 6a,
∂ψr
∂xi
= λpi. (8)
This is the same result as in the standard theory of individual demand: the
marginal change in the preference function with respect to a change in con-
sumption of good i is proportional to the price of i.
In the general case, good i could provide a mix of satiable and non-satiable
material satisfiers, or no material satisfiers at all. To understand the implica-
tions of the general case we express pi as
∑n
k=1 pikbki + qi. Out of the set of
material satisfiers k ∈ [1, n] we denote by S the subset of satiable satisfiers, so
that the complement of S, S¯ contains the non-satiable satisfiers. We then have
∂ψr
∂xi
= λ
qi + ∑
k∈S∪S¯
pikbki
+∑
k∈S
µkbki, (9)
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where the sum over the union S ∪ S¯ is equivalent to a sum over all the k from
1 to n. This equation has a rather challenging right-hand side, with unknown
Lagrange multipliers λ and µk. While we do not know the values of these
multipliers, we now show that the terms multiplied by the µk cancel against
some of the terms multiplied by λ, so that in fact we are concerned with only a
single Lagrange multiplier, λ.
To show this we use a result from standard optimization theory. If ψ∗r (Ir,β)
is the solution to the optimization problem, then
∂ψ∗r
∂Ir
= λ, (10a)
∂ψ∗r
∂βk
= µk. (10b)
(This can be understood informally by studying the objective function, Equation
5.) From these equations, we have that
λ+
µk
pik
=
∂ψ∗r
∂Ir
+
1
pik
∂ψ∗r
∂βk
. (11)
However, because of the budget constraint (Equation 7), an increase in income
Ir is exactly offset by an increase in the cost of meeting the minimum level of
satisfaction of material need k, pikβk; that is, an increase in income has the
same effect on expenditure for non-material needs as a reduction in the cost of
meeting material needs. The right-hand side of this equation is therefore zero,
and we have
λ+
µk
pik
= 0. (12)
We now re-arrange the terms in Equation 9, and write it as
∂ψr
∂xi
= λ
qi +∑
k∈S¯
pikbki
+∑
k∈S
(
λ+
µk
pik
)
pikbki. (13)
The final term we see, from Equation 12, to be zero, so we have
∂ψr
∂xi
= λ
qi +∑
k∈S¯
pikbki
 (14a)
≡ λp¯i. (14b)
We have now eliminated all of the terms multiplied by the µk. The resulting
expression involves only prices, known coefficients, and the single Lagrange mul-
tiplier λ. The expression in parentheses in Equation 14a is a price, which we
write in Equation 14b as p¯i. This “effective price” lies between the qi and the
pi,
qi ≤ p¯i ≤ pi. (15)
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It is equal to pi in the case that good i supplies no satiable goods, as we saw
above; it equals qi in the case that good i supplies only satiable goods; otherwise
it lies between the two values.
Relating this to the standard individual consumption theory, we see from
Equation 14b that the marginal rate of substitution between goods is, as usual,
a ratio of prices, but here the relevant price is the effective price p¯i, rather
than the market price pi. Also as in the standard theory, non-poor consumers
seek their preferred bundle of goods subject to a budget constraint. However,
the relevant portion of their budget is their disposable income after taking into
account expenditure for basic material needs; that is, Ir −
∑n
k=1 pikβk.
Although goods can satisfy a mix of satiable and insatiable needs, it is
instructive to consider a “satiable good” that only satisfies satiable material
needs and possibly some non-material needs, but no insatiable material needs.
The effective price is then equal to qi, which is the gap between the market price
for the good pi and the base price
∑n
k=1 pikbki of providing for material needs.
In the case that such a good provides only satiable material needs, and no non-
material needs, the market price is the base price, and qi = 0. Consumers will
switch away from such goods, if they have sufficient income, to goods which also
satisfy non-material needs.
3.3. Aggregate demand
As noted above, the decision rule for poor consumers does not uniquely
determine the choice of goods, but we showed that at each level of income
Ir ≤ Ip(1), there is a specific bundle of material satisfiers yp(Ir,pi) and argued
that there is likely to be a reasonably predictable bundle of goods xp(Ir,pi)
that supplies those material satisfiers. For non-poor consumers, and for satiable
goods, consumption saturates near the satisfaction level β; for non-satiable
goods consumption is determined by the individual effective preference functions
of non-poor consumers ψr(x).
For a satiable material need k we can construct an excess demand function
that does not refer to specific goods at all. Denoting by mp the number of
poor consumers out of a total of m consumers, we can write the excess demand
function for satiable material satisfier k, ηˆk(pi), as
ηˆk(pi) =
mp∑
r=1
(ypk(Ir,pi)− ω˜rk) +
m∑
r=mp+1
(βk − ω˜rk) . (16)
In this equation, ω˜r is consumer r’s endowment in terms of material needs
satisfiers rather than in terms of goods. Differentiating with respect to the base
price pij of material need j (and assuming the change is not so large that it
moves people from the non-poor to the poor category or vice versa), we have,
for fixed levels of endowments,
∂ηˆk
∂pij
=
mp∑
r=1
(
∂ypk
∂Ir
∂Ir
∂pij
+
∂ypk
∂pij
)
. (17)
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The change in income with a change in price of a good (or material needs
satisfier) is equal to the endowment in that good: ∂Ir/∂pij = ω˜rj , so we can
write the equation above as
∂ηˆk
∂pij
=
mp∑
r=1
(
∂ypk
∂Ir
ω˜rj +
∂ypk
∂pij
)
. (18)
We expect the second term in the parenthesis to always be negative: other
things being equal, an increase in the price of any material needs satisfier reduces
consumption of all material needs satisfiers amongst the poor, while among the
non-poor, consumption of satiable material needs satisfiers is insensitive to a
change in price.
The first term in parenthesis in Equation 18 might be positive or negative,
depending on whether the poor are endowed with enough of the material needs
satisfier that the addition to their income offsets the rise in price. The re-
sult for an individual consumer is indeterminate and, indeed, this illustrates a
classic problem in development economics—does a rise in price of basic food-
stuffs increase or decrease poverty, when poor farmers make their living in part
by selling the food? In one recent survey, Ivanic and Martin (2008) find that
both increases and decreases in poverty occur after a rise in food prices, but
that poverty increases are more common. At an aggregate level the net result
for the own-price response (that is, when j = k) must be negative; if it were
not, then poor consumers could become rich by selling each other an identical
type of good. Cross-price effects remain indeterminate, as an increase in, say,
food prices may allow a majority of poor households to increase their energy
consumptio;, but overall we expect that the sector encompassing satiable basic
material needs to have relatively stable prices.
For a good i that supplies non-satiable material needs or non-material needs,
consumption by the poor is equal to xpi(Ir, ω˜r). For non-poor consumers, the
consumption decision is, as we have shown above, exactly the same as in stan-
dard consumption theory, but with reduced income I ′r ≡ Ir −
∑n
k=1 pikβk and
effective prices p¯. Thus, from the SMD-KK theorem, aggregate demand for
non-poor consumers can be almost any function hˆNP(p¯, I
′
r). We therefore write
hˆi(p) =
mp∑
r=1
(xpi(Ir,ωr)− ωri) + hˆNP,i(p¯, I ′r). (19)
For these goods, as the SMD-KK theorem applies to consumption by the non-
poor, the stability of prices depends on how many poor consumers there are
compared to the total population and the disposable income of non-poor con-
sumers.
While we remind the reader that Jackson and Marks (1999) found that even
in the UK consumption to meet material needs appears to command a large
fraction of household budgets, we consider as a hypothetical case the limit of
very high levels of income such that the number of poor is small, the purchasing
power of the non-poor is large, and hˆi(p) ≈ hˆNP,i(p, I ′r). In this regime the
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SMD-KK theorem holds true for most consumption, and the micro-level theory
places few constraints on aggregate consumption. At lower levels of income, the
number of poor is large and the purchasing power of the non-poor is constrained
by their need to meet basic material needs. In that limit we can expect some
variability in price, since the SMD-KK theorem applies to the excess demand
of the non-poor, hˆNP(p, I
′
r), but much of household budgets is directed toward
satisfying material needs.
4. Stability
While our main purpose was to concretely demonstrate that a needs-based
theory at individual level leads to a different outcome than the SMD-KK the-
orem predicts, we further argued that some prices are likely to be relatively
stable. Specifically, there is a stable set of base prices for the satisfiers of sa-
tiable material needs and, if material needs make up much of household budgets,
there is little additional purchasing power in the less stable sector that supplies
non-material needs. We suggest that this economy is roughly characterized by
a “base” set of goods with reasonably stable prices surmounted by a “froth” of
goods meeting diverse and possibly changing individual non-material needs.
It might be objected that this picture is inconsistent with the empirical
facts of instability in food, housing, and energy prices. Indeed, in a study of the
thirty-six components of the US consumer price index (CPI) from 1967 to 1997,
Clark (2001) provides a table in which the least volatile third of CPI components
includes such non-basic consumer categories as personal care services; food away
from home; and entertainment services and commodities. More basic needs
categories, such as men’s and boys’ apparel and medical care also appear, but
they make up a small portion of the whole. In contrast, the most volatile
third contains such items as fuel oil; meats, poultry, fish, and eggs; fruits and
vegetables; infants’ and toddlers’ apparel; and “other food” at home. However,
the implications of the theory are more nuanced than this, and require some
discussion.
In the theory presented in this paper only the base prices pik for each material
need are expected to be relatively stable, and they are stable only with respect
to prices of goods that satisfy the same material need. A given sector (e.g., food,
energy, and housing) might be more or less volatile on the whole, a dynamic that
we did not include in our analysis. To understand why this is so, note that we
have adopted the standard approach to constructing excess demand functions,
which treats the entire economy as an exchange economy in which consumers
hold “endowments” that they can sell. While this clearly oversimplifies most
aspects of a modern economy, it is a reasonable representation of household farm
production. Annual (or seasonal) endowments from farms consist in the foods
they produce as a flow from their stocks of land, and that flow is both highly
variable and correlated across many households. As a consequence, from year to
year there will be differences in the aggregate endowments and hence in the price;
but we did not consider this inter-annual fluctuation in supply in our discussion
of price stability. The cost of “shelter” (the CPI category) is influenced both by
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the demand for shelter in itself (corresponding to a flow of benefits) and also the
demand for real estate as a household investment (the stock that generates the
benefits); normally the prices are linked, but the real estate market is subject to
booms and busts (Shiller, 2007). Energy price volatility is affected by multiple
factors, including expectations of future supply (Pindyck, 2004) and prices of
commodities are more volatile than those of manufactures (Jacks et al., 2010).
The simple exchange economy model that is standard when studying aggregate
demand does not easily accommodate these dynamics, which involve stocks,
futures markets, and industrial production.
We therefore turn to less aggregate CPI commodity groupings, as studied by
Clem (1985). He calculated a volatility index for different commodities in the
US CPI as the standard deviation of monthly price changes from 1975 to 1984.
As expected, food prices are more volatile than other prices, with a volatility
index of 3.5, compared to an average of 1.7 for all finished goods. However, of
the 15 commodity groups within the category “finished consumer foods”, the
least volatile third included, from least to most volatile: bakery products (0.6);
dairy products (0.8); processed fruits and vegetables (0.9); other cereals (1.0);
and soft drinks (1.0). The most volatile third included: pork (4.4); processed
poultry (4.8); fresh fruits (6.3); eggs (7.0); and fresh and dried vegetables (9.1).
Price indices for other meats are only slightly less volatile than that of pork.
Thus the least volatile foods are, for the most part, the most basic, and their
prices are considerably less volatile than those of more readily substituted foods
such as meats, eggs, and fresh fruits and vegetables. Considering energy, prices
of natural gas, fuel oil, and gasoline were relatively volatile, with indices ranging
from 2.6-3.7. While energy price volatility is not unusual for commodities, it
is high for consumer goods, and so it stands out (Regnier, 2007). Excluding
both energy and food from the category of finished consumer goods, Clem’s list
contains 21 commodity groups. The least volatile third includes: apparel (0.4);
household appliances (0.4); household furniture (0.4); alcoholic beverages (0.5);
over-the-counter drugs (0.5); prescription drugs (0.5); and sporting and athletic
goods (0.6). The most volatile third includes: sanitary papers, etc. (0.8); home
electronic equipment (0.9); tires and tubes (1.1); cosmetics, etc. (1.3); small
arms and ammunition (1.4); tobacco products (2.1); and platinum and karat
gold jewelry (5.7). While mixed, there is a clear tendency for more basic and
necessary goods to have more stable prices.
Tentatively accepting our proposed division between a “base” and a “froth”
in the economy, we note that there are other possible sources of universal and
reasonably determinate structures for demands that could expand the base. For
example, households must engage in activities to either build up or maintain
their capitals—social, human, physical, natural, and financial—and those activ-
ities fall into stable patterns—group memberships and social outings; education
and apprenticeships; buying a house, motorbike, or car; planting and building up
soil; and saving. Also, some “premium” payments over basic needs—captured
by the vector q in the model—may be quite constrained, as when a relatively af-
fluent family buys a house in a safe neighborhood with access to good schools for
which their monthly payments consumes much of their budget. Consumption
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patterns are also stabilized through habit (Nelson and Consoli, 2010; Loasby,
2001), and could also be stabilized through heterogeneous networks of interact-
ing agents (Kirman, 1992).
5. Conclusion
Starting from a micro-level needs-based theory of individual demand, we
showed that the aggregate excess demand function is not arbitrary. We have
therefore shown that there exists a micro-level theory that does not yield the
results predicted by the SMD-KK theorem. This was anticipated by Chip-
man (2006), who pointed out that consumer demand theory constrains the
forms of individual demand functions and suggested that if individual pref-
erence functions were not arbitrary then the SMD-KK might not hold. We
avoided the implications of the SMD-KK theorem by positing that some con-
sumer preferences—those derived from basic needs—are universal and reason-
ably determinate. We also posited that some of them are satiable. The micro-
level theory in this paper therefore differs from the standard theory that un-
derlies the SMD-KK result and the theory of general equilibrium (Ginsburgh
and Keyzer, 2002), but is similar to other needs-based theories of individual
consumption (e.g., Seeley, 1992; Stigler and Becker, 1977).
Whether basic needs are or are not necessary in the individual-level theory of
demand, we argue that they are necessary to understand aggregate demand. The
aggregation problem arises because the micro-level theory, through successive
waves of abstraction, has produced a lean theory but without the population-
wide commonalities that make aggregation possible. There is a long history of
economic thought on hierarchical patterns of consumption (Drakopoulos and
Karayiannis, 2004), and continuing interest in other fields, that can be brought
to bear. Alfred Marshall helped to remove basic needs from mathematical con-
sumption theory, but also developed a reasonably coherent hierarchical picture
of needs that is not very different from contemporary models (Haines, 1982).
Perhaps it is time to reunite Marshall’s efforts, and bring human needs back
into the theory of consumption.
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